BOOK REVIEWS
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. Harcotrt,
Brace & Howe, 1920, pp. 316.
The author of this book is so well known that the mere mention of his
name is an all-sufficient reminder of his untiring and varied services as editor,
author, teacher, historian, jurist.and judge. The manner and generosity of
his performances, in discharging the debt to the profession which both Coke
and Bacon laid upon each of its members, have been such as to make him our
general creditor for his assumption of our debts. The character and value of
his edition of Kent's Commentaries will become all the more apparent when
the Centenar* of Kent's labors is celebrated a few years hence by the American
Bar Association. His monumental book "The Common Law" stands and will
stand for all time as one of the lighthouses of Jurisprudence. His contributions
to the Harvard Law Review shine as particular stars in the constellated mass.
His lectures to law students are among the most precious memories of his pupils.
His historic expeditions into our terra incognita, like Stanley's Dark Continent,
have been the despair as well as the incentive of many lesser explorers. The
breadth of his juristic knowledge has sustained many of his most important
judicial utterances. The sparkle of his style has revealed the beauties as well
as the depth of many hidden caves of learning.
This collection consists of papers or parts of papers hitherto widely dispersed, in which views of law and life have not been elsewhere so fully expressed
by the author. In the preface he modestly refers to them as "little fragments
of my fleece that I have left upon the hedges of life." Examination proves that
the fleece was golden, and the regions in which the fragments were foLnd indicate the enterprise and daring of our Jason.
The papers are twenty-eight in number, arranged in the order of their
date, which disturbs their continuity of subject or of treatment. Their full
force and effect, however, can be gathered by a rearrangement and classification
under three main heads-Legal Essays, under the topics of Early English Equity;
Agency, in two parts; Privilege, Malice and Intent, and Executors; Addresses
to Law Students, under the jheadings of The Law, The Profession of the Law, The
Use of Law Schools, The Bar as a Profession, The Path of the Law, Legal Interpretation, Law in Science and Science in Law, Address at Northwestern University Law School, and Law and the Court; Miscellaneous or Occasional Utterances, in which estimates are given of the characters and works of Montesquieu,
Professor Maitland, W. S. Holdsworth, the Historian of English Law, John
Marshall, and Bracton, interspersed with Economic Elements, Ideals and Doubts,
and an Introduction to Continental Legal Historical Series.
The paper on Early English Equity is devoted to a demonstration of the
part which Equity has played in the development of English law. Agreeing
with Mr. Adams that the most important contribution of the Chancery has
been its procedure, which was confessedly that of the Canon law, the author
controverts the error that its substantive law is merely the product of the procedure. With this object in view he proceeds to a discussion of Uses, which he
considers the greatest contribution to the substantive law which has ever been
credited to Chancery. He contends that the feoffee to uses of early English
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law corresponds point by point to the salman or executor of the early German
law as described by Beseler fifty years ago, and step by step, following the development of the office and obligations of an executor to observe the will of a
testator, and the absence of appropriate remedies at common law by which a
cestui que use could enforce his rights, he reaches the conclusion that the doctrine of uses rested on the fiats, or trust rel3osed and the obligation of good
faith, and that circumstance remains as a mark of Teutonic origin as well as of
the ecclesiastical origin of the jurisdiction. This is of importance because it
shows a source of jurisdiction antedating the influx of the civil law into England, and connecting the common notion of lawyers that the law of trusts sprang
entirely from the law of Rome. The doctrine of uses was not the reaction of the
remedy by subpoena, although the form of remedy reacted powerfully upon the
conception of the right. Then, through the identification of substantive and
remedial rights, a use came to be regarded as a right to a subpoena, losing the
character of a jus in rem, and passing into the category of choses in action.
Under the head of Contract, he disputes the common notion that the Common
Law borrowed the doctrine of consideration from the Chancery. The Chancery, having become a separate Court, asserted a power of which it had been
shorn as an ecclesiastical tribunal by giving a remedy for contracts for which
the common law courts of the King afforded none, thus retaining some relics
of ancient custom which had been dropped by the Common Law, but had been
kept alive by the Church.
In the two papers upon Agency, the thesis is that the present law of agency
has been caused by the survival of ancient doctrines of the rights and liabilities
of heads of families based on substantive grounds which have long since disappeared, but that in modern days these doctrines have been generalized into
a fiction, which, while largely formal, has reacted on the law, the fiction being
that within the scope of the agency, principal and agent are one. In a narrower
sense, the law of agency presents but a special application of the law of master
and servant, but in the early law of England, in every branch of the subjecttort, contract, possession, ratification-the fiction survived. As time went on
the liability of the principal or master was not confined to family relations, but
was worked out in terms of master and servant on analogies suggested by the
eatlier relationship.
In the second part of the paper, the history of agency as applied to contract
is elaborately traced. The value of the paper consists not so largely in the
conclusions reached, which the author candidly admits may be disputable, but
in the demonstration that the study of legal history is the surest means of reaching an understanding of the present doctrines of the law, disclosing their origin,
and in part explaining their anomalies.
In the paper on Privilege, Malice and Intent, the broad field of Torts is
entered, illustrated by questions of policy, economic interferences, combinations
as to rates, boycotts, and the like, considered from the broad viewpoint of temporal damage, whether foreseen or actually intended, or negligently disregarded
as to consequences.
In the paper on Executors, the present fiduciary character of the office is
traced through various stages of development into the modern doctrine, and the
gradual displacement of heirs from their primary responsibility for the debts of
the deceased is shown. The paper should be read in connection with the one
on Early English Equity.
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In the Addresses to Law Students there is a splendid uplift in the book.
The effect of a continuous reading of them, is not so much a settlement of disputed questions, or the provocation of discussion, as to breathe into the reader
the catching enthusiasm of the author in urging upon students the pursuit of
"the anatomy of legal ideas as marked out by the English school of jurisprudence," and "the embryology of the same conceptions" to be found in the
works of German students of the subject. "Happiness * * * cannot be
won simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income of
fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great enough to win the prize needs other
food besides success. The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those
which give it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become
a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable purpose, a hint of
the universal law."
The remaining papers, biographical, analytical, historical, philosophic
are permeated by the same spirit. The law, its universality, its sublimity,
its infinity-these are themes dwelt on with enthusiasm and faith. The law
--"itis all a symbol, if you like, but so is the flag. The flag is but a bit of
bunting to one who insists on prgse. Yet, thanks to Marshall and to the men
of his generation-and for this above all we celebrate him and them-its red
is our life blood, its stars our world, it sblue our heaven. It owns our land.
At will it throws away our lives."
The great names in the law-Monfesquieu, "one of the high priests of
thought," "a precursor of political economy," "the precursor of Beccaria in
the criminal law;" "the precursor of Burke when Burke seems a hundred years
ahead of his time," the man whose book had "a dazzling success at the moment,
and since then probably has done as much to remodel the world as any product
of the eighteenth century;" Bracton, the mightiest name in English law prior
to Coke, whose monumental work is now in the editorial hands of Professor
Woodbine of Yale, generously backed and splendidly equipped for the task;
Msaitland, the incomparable scholar and writer, whom "one is almost ashamed to
praise (as) a dead master for what he did in a field where he was acknowledged
to be supreme:" Holdswoarth,whose history of English Law is to be recommended
equally "To philosophers who can understand it and to practical students of
the law;" and John Marshall,"a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to
vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his
greatness consists in his being there," whose success "marks the fact that all
thought is social, is on its way to action; that, to borrow the expression of a
French writer, every idea tends to become first a catechism and then a code;"
these names serve to supply the opportunities to the author of sketching in striking outlines certain crises in legal development, and of presenting expressive
portraits of the main actors in legal work, whose relationship to practical affairs
is too little known, and so often neglected.
Let not the busy lawyer, immersed in the affairs of the court room and the.
office, cast this book aside with the remark that it differs so much from a volume
of reports that he cannot cite it as authority upon the point of a case. It will
open his eyes, if he have insight, to the true relationship of many ideas with which
he has had but a speaking acquaintance, but which he never suspected to be of
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the same lineage. Let not the student imagine it to be so recondite as to discourage the perseverance requisite for its mastery.
To both practical lawyer and student it will be found to possess value,
for, above all else, its unquenchable spirit will inspire and refresh all real lovers
of the law.
Hampton L. Carson.
THE

PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADvISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS.

Report and Commen-

tary by James Brown Scott. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for Interantional Peace, Washington, 1920, pp. 235.
This little book takes the form of a letter to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace by James Brown Scott, Secretary and Director of the Division of International Law, describing the personnel, proceedings and conclusions of the advisory committee of jurists invited by the Council of the League
of Nations to prepare a plan for a permanent Court of International Justice.
After an account of the members and the proceedings, we have the text
of the project finally adopted, with comments; the resolutions of the committee;
the French and English texts of the project and resolutions; the Covenant of
the League of Nations, and, in the appendix, the text of various recent projects
for a court of international justice. The student has thus, in easily accessible
form, the materials necessary for a study of the subject.
The work which Mr. Scott here has undertaken requires no originality
or display of literary workmanship, and calls for no criticism except perhaps
the remark that some of the comments on the text seem somewhat unnecessary.
The chief interest lies in the work of the committee. These learned men met at
the Hague during the months of June and July of 192o, and too much cannot be
said in praise of their self-denying efforts in the cause of international peace, and,
if the work they have done fails, it will fail not because of any omission on their
part but because of circumstances over which they had no control, and which
circumstances are, in brief, the present undeveloped state of the society composed
of the independent states of the world, a society which has as yet developed no
political power nor any means of exercising such power even if it were in existence. An effective court of justice is necessarily based on the presence of sufficient political power to enforce its decrees. It appears that one of the principal points of difficulty was whether the jurisdiction of the court should be compulsory and that the compulsory features of the plan adopted were discarded by
the Assembly of the League of Nations in subsequent session at Geneva. It is
clear, however, that a comjulsory provision for compulsory jurisdiction will be
fruitless in the absence of any power to enforce it, and that discussion over
whether such a provision shall be inserted is, after all, purely academic except in
so far as such a provision may be in the nature of a seed from which a compulsory jurisdiction may come into being in the future.
The other principal difficulty lies in the manner of appointing the judges.
In this respect the committee did the best they could under the present circumstances. The ideal court will undoubtedly consist of judges appointed for life
and giving their entire time to the business of the court. The appointing power
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must be independent and reside in the politicai power which is back of the court,
and thus we are brought again to what may be said to be the pons asinorum
of the entire project.
The Carnegie Endowment has rendered a distinctive service in printing
in so accessible a form these original materials for the student of international
law.
Roland R. Foulke.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By Zechariah Chafee Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard University. Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920, pp. 431.
When the hosts of Cambyses invaded Egypt, it is recorded that the Egyptian soldiers refused to fight and were slain unresisting, because each invader
bore before him a cat bound to his arm as a shield. This superstitious fear,
in the light of modem reason, appears grotesque; but neither the Declaration
of Independence nor the Constitution of the United States changed human
nature. Strong men are swept down, and the most cherished hopes of a christian world yield under stress and strain of hysteria.
When the mobs of Paris, wild with their new liberty and drunk with power,
challenged the established institutions of the world, 300,ooo- Jacobins dominated the 26,ooo,ooo people of France. Driven. by fear of losing their liberty
they destroyed the monarchy, established the worship of the Goddess of Reason,
attempted to reduce the population to 5,ooo,ooo, and did massacre 3,000,ooo
persons before their madness was checked.
A small minority of the people of Russia organized as demagogic despots,
are repeating on a larger scale the horrors of the French Revolution. Little
wonder that mankind is apprehensive. During four and a half years the fiery
concentrated eneriy of the human race has been applied to the principle of
self-preservation; whatever a strong and preponderant public opinion regarded
as inimical to the public welfare was treated as within the scope of the police
power to restrain, and constitutional limitations were impotent to furnish protection.
Matthew Arnold proposed in the interest of honest thinking that we cease
to employ those expressions which have been spoiled by long and continued misconception and misuse. Among such battered terms he designated the word
Liberty.
The misconception and consequent bewilderment of the unthinking is
due to the apprehension of liberty as an abstract, and not a relative quantity.
Having absorbed Jefferson's delaration "that each human being with the endowment of life from the hand of God starts with the inalienable rights of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness," some minds are unable to discriminate between
the absolute civil and political liberty of a man on an uninhabited island, and his
relative rights and duties as an individual dwelling in a society restricted by law,
where the citizen must consider not himself alone, but the entire body politic
of which he is but one, and submit to such restraints as the sovereign of which
he is a part, imposes.
Herodotus, describing the freemen of Greece, said-"though free they are
not absolutely free for they have a master over them, the law."
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The war has brought into prominence the fact that the aberrations of undisciplined minds regard the constitutional power which lawfully conscripted
millions of men to fight upon the battlefields of Europe, as impotent to stop the
orator.
treasonable mouthings of a soap-box
Professor Chafee's book "Freedom of Speech" in a wise, sane, dignified,
impartial, lucid and admirable way, has set down the rights and limitations of
the individual in relation to freedom of speech. He removes in the very beginning of his volume a prevalent belief that the constitution assures an unrestricted
right to pronounce upon all occasions, restrained only by the penalties attached
to slander. The reader is informed that there is no provision in the constitution
relating to the subject other than the security afforded members of Congress,
and that in the First Amendment the prohibition is found which forbids Congress
to make any law "abridging the freedom of speech;" but neither the constitution nor the amendments enlarge, restrict or in any manner other than as there
expressed, impair or amplify the right of the citizen to freedom of speech.
The book defines this right in clear terms, and traces its historical development.
The right of self-defense is at all times inherent in every nation. There
are times when half baked social and economic philosophies which ignore alike
fundamental traits of human nature and vital principles of human liberty are as
harmless as a child's prattle; at other times the state of intelligence may be such
that the populace will be thrown into a flame. The author indicates in clear
terms the distinction between license and liberty, mania and reason, and shows
with what facility debauchery may be cloaked in the name of freedom. He makes
it plain that when from necessity a crime must be designated in generic terms,
the exercise of intuition, common sense, and calm judgment, free from hysteria,
is demanded not alone from the people, but in the tribunals before whom the
accused are brought for trial.
The distinction between the right to discuss and urge the repeal or modification of laws and changes in government, and advocating resistance to the
law, and advising the overthrow byviolence of the government, is made apparent.
How much depends upon a proper sense of proportion is shown by a wealth
of citation of cases tried in the courts, recording the treatment of those who would
make chaos and call it progress, of the "conscientious objector" who prefers
that his liberty be secured by the efforts of better men than himself, of those
casual persons too proud to fight who detached themselves from the great tragedy,
of the alien enemy, and sympathizers with the remorseless Hun. Time, place
and circumstance, it is shown, are elements which enter largely into the right to
speak freely.
A man with educational advantages to indicate the impropriety of his
conduct, attempted to deliver, unbidden, a diatribe against capital, and interrupted a Sunday service in a fashionable New York church. His removal to
a prison cell for disturbing religious worship called forth an attack upon what
he regarded as an unlawful restraint of free speech; an address that could have
been delivered with impunity at a proper time in an appropriate place was here
improper.
One prompted by a commendable desire to lighten the gloom of a funeral
gathering, taking advantage of the silence of those seated around the casket
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of the departed, who should contribute to the occasion a comic song, or "funny
story," would find no constitutional guarantee to prevent his ejection.
During the war there was an upheaval of the whole national life, a tribute
demanded of thousands of precious lives, and a ceaseless and pitiless drain upon
our potential vitality. The nation suffered from "nerves;" and there was
neither sympathy nor forbearance for those who by word or deed rendered aid
or comfort to the foe.
"Freedom of Speech" contains a magazine of information. Professor
Chafee has made a book of great value and absorbing interest not alone for the
layman, but to the lawyer and judge. He has fortified his text by an excellent
bibliographic appendix, an index of reported cases under the Espionage Acts,
and a digest of state statutes appertaining to freedom of speech, together with a
complete index to the entire volume.
The book is a fine piece of work, well executed, and sheds a brilliant light
where illumination is greatly needed.
J. Willis Martin, LL.D.
First Judicial District of
No.
5,
Pleas
Common
of
Court
President Judge,
Pennsylvania.
CASES ox SuRTvisai.

By Clinton DeWitt.

Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indian-

.apolis, 1920, pp. 726.

The editingof acase-bookis much more diffidult than would appear to those
who have not tried to.select from the great mass of more or less inconsistent decisions of the courts a representative group sufficient in scope to give the student
a fair view of the subject. Should the historical side be emphasized? Or should
the main object be to develop those controversial subjects which lead to classroom discussion and, as the saying is, teach the student to think? In suretyship,
the case-books of Professors Ames and Henning have covered the historical
side very fully and Professor DeWitt in presenting a new collection of cases has
frankly made it his object to present the modem side of the problems connected
with this most important subject, particularly those connected with the corporate surety, and those large enterprises with which the modem practice of requiring bonds is specially associated. Much law has been made in the last few years
in this field and more is in the making. Hence this selection will be found both
interesting and practical. If any fault is to be found with the book at all, it
may be suggested that in places too many cumulative cases on the same point
are given, and more cases might have been given on the equities of the surety,
particularly on equitable exoneration, But on the whole, it is a very admirable
piece of work, particularly in that part given to the surety's defenseswhere
will be found most of the problems that arise in connection with the practical
working of bonding contracts.
William Henry Lloyd.
OUTLINES OF HisTORicAL JURIsPRUDENcE.

(Volume I-Introduction;

Tribal Law). By Sir Paul Vinogradoff. Oxford University Press, New York
City, 1920, pp. ix, 428, and The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1920.
As the title indicates, the work before us is a treatise, (the first volume of
one, to be precise), not on analytical or philosophical jurisprudence, but on the
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historical development of legal institutions. It is perforce comparative at the
same time, though primarily restricted, it would seem,to Aryan institutions.
Accordingly the treatment of the subject proper begins on page 163 under the
heading of "Tribal Law." Here are discussed the origins of the modern monogamic.family and of the institution of marriage. Professor Vinogradoff brings
to bear upon the subject the results of a very wide reading ind shows a healthy
reluctance to undue simplification at the expense of the evidence. He will not
adopt either the theory of original promiscuity or that of the single pair, properly
observing that it is not likely that one key will open the safe containing the secret
of the pre-historical development of the race. Making diligent use, however,
of the evidence coming from a great variety of sources, Prof. Vinogradoff does
discover traces of loose unions among primitive peoples, group marriages, matrilinear arrangements, patrilinear and patriarchal schemes, and he endeavors to
explain each and the transformation of one into the other by reference to physical
and economic conditions.
Having devoted three chapters to the discussion of this subject in general,
Professor Vinogradoff, in Chapter IV of this part of the work, passes to a consideration of the Aryan peoples in particular and comes to the conclusion on a
somewhat insufficient basis, it seems to the present writer, that the Aryans at
about the time of their dispersion, had a patriarchal form of society, and hence
all traces of matrilinear arrangements to be found later in the various countries
of their migrations must be charged or credited to the pre-Aryan population
which the Aryan conquerors absorbed.
Marital unions are the basis and starting point of the community and
ultimately of society and the State. Prof. Vinogradoff lays stress on this fact
and describes the ancient forms of communalism as made necessary by the
helplessness of the isolated individual economically as well as physically. He
shows how families combined to form the kindred, how they expanded along
agnatic lines to form the clan or gens, and how the combination of clans gave
rise to the phratries, which in turn federated for purposes of defense to form the
tribe. In connection with the discussion of this development, Prof. Vinogradoff investigates the legal arrangements and institutions which existed during
the various stages of social development, such as succession and inheritance,
primogeniture and ultimogeniture, rights of women, testation, the blood-feud
and the manner of redress by composition, land tenure, the legal process or procedure and so forth. It would be out of place in a brief notice such as this to
give a more detailed outline of the results obtained by Prof. Vinogradoff, but
the reader will be interested in knowing that Prof. Vinogradoff bases his treatment throughout on written sources gathered from every part of Indo-European
society. His method is to outline briefly the essence of the institution in question
and to illustrate its various forms as found, for instance, in Iceland, among the
Slavs of a certain locality, in the Indian village, in Wales, and so forth, at the
same time endeavoring as far as possible to show that the form assumed by
the arrangement in question was a necessary outcome of the conditions of life
among the people, to which it was adapted.
All this is extremely instructive and interesting and the reader whose
inclinations lie in this direction will be grateful to Prof. Vinogradoff for the present
volume, and will await with pleasurable anticipation the succeeding volumes,
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of which the next, we are told, will deal with the Jurisprudence of the Greek City
ard will not be unduly delayed in its appearance. Prof. Vinogradoff is peculiarly
suited to the treatment of so difficult and complicated a subject not only by reason
of his great learning and wide reading but also by reason of his varied intellectual
allegiance, if we may so put it. Englishmen as well as -Americansare apt to be
insular or provincial and to take too much for granted. Prof. Vinogradoff is a
Russian by birth and education, and an Englishman by residence and adoption,
and hence is not too much committed to any one point of view, and is less likely
to ignore any attitude, however unusual or extreme. This is evident even in his
treatment of so technical a subject as jurisprudence. Reading Holland, we would
gather that the analytical treatment represented by him and others of the same
school, is nothing short of jurisprudence sub-specie aeternitatis. Vinogradoff
reminds us that it is individualistic jurisprudence. "Recent discussions," he
says, (p. 157) "make it abundantly clear that if individualistic civilization were
to give way before one based on a socialistic conception of the social tie, all the
positions of jurisprudence would have to be reconsidered." Accordingly in
the lengthy and suggestive introduction to the book, Prof. Vinogradoff classifies
the stages and types of social arrangement and law to be treated in a work on
historical jurisprudence as follows: x. Origins in Totemistic Society; 2. Tribal
Law; 3. Civil Law; 4. Mediaeval Law in its combination as Canon and Feudal
.Law; s. Individualistic Jurisprudence; 6. Beginnings of Socialistic Jurisprudence. And this must not mislead us into thinking-that Vinogradoff is a socialist
of the Marxian type, or a sumpathizer with the Soviet system in Russia. Quite
the contrary. "The error of materialistic fatalism," he says (page 82), "does
not merely falsify the historical and scientific theory of the Marxists. It threatens the policy of practical socialism with a reduction to absurdity. If the life
of organic evolution tends to war and to the levelling of society on the standard
of the lower classes,.it is obvious that it will lead to degradation in all respects
and that all complex tasks requiring skilful handling will suffer in the process.
Problems of engineering, of medicine, of law, of economics, can not be solved by
mere appeals to communism. You do not build a railway bridge by the light
of Marxist doctrine. We have lived to witness the blessings of the rule of workmen who do not work and-of soldiers who do not fight in a great country confronted with every kind of difficulty and danger. Let us hope, at any rate, that
the catastrophe of the Soviets may serve as an object lesson to illustrate the truth
that it is not by discouraging education, industry and credit in favor of moral
license, violence and corruption that the Socialists can hope to regenerate the
world. If they want a serious trial for their views, they ought like every other
great movement of opinion, to strive for a commanding position in the domain
of thought and to justify the preponderance of the working class by its educational achievements."
The 16o-page introduction also illustrates the author's breadth of view
and variety of learning. It deals with the extremely important subject of the
relation of law to the various sciences which affect it closely, such as logic, psychology, political and social science, and economics. The treatment here is
bound to be brief, for each subject is so important and complex as to require a
volume in itself, but, as it is the first time that we read in English a discussion
of this sort in connection with a treatise of jurisprudence, we welcome it as a
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beginning, erudite and suggestive, which, let us hope, will lead the way to
more ample treatment at other hands.
The latter part of the introduction is devoted to a historical sketch of
theories of jurisprudence. This, too, is a rarity in English writing. And a
satisfactory account of the general development of Jurisprudence is still a desideratum in any language, as Vinogradoff admits. While this outline also is
too brief to take the place of a history, it is a pioneer in English and exhibits,
like the rest of the work, Vinogradoff's wide reading and extensive erudition.
Not the least useful part of the book is the Bibliography at the end, pages
373-398.
Isaac Husik.
Philosophy Department, University of Pennsylvania..

